Currently released so far... 5267 / 251,287
Articles
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Amsterdam
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Browse by tag
AF
ASEC
AR
AORC
AJ
AM
AMGT
AE
AU
AGMT
AG
AS
AFIN
APER
ABUD
ATRN
AL
AEMR
ACOA
AO
AX
AMED
ADCO
AODE
AFFAIRS
AC
ASIG
ABLD
AA
AFU
ASUP
AROC
ATFN
AVERY
APCS
AER
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AEC
APECO
CU
CO
CH
CDG
CIA
CACM
CDB
CI
CS
CVIS
CA
CBW
CASC
CD
CV
CMGT
CLINTON
CE
CJAN
CG
CF
CN
CAN
COUNTER
CIS
CM
CONDOLEEZZA
COE
CR
CY
CTM
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CPAS
CWC
CT
CKGR
CB
CACS
COM
CJUS
CARSON
CL
COUNTERTERRORISM
EG
ECON
ETTC
EFIN
EZ
ETRD
EUN
ELAB
EU
EINV
EAID
EMIN
ENRG
ECPS
EN
ER
ET
ES
EPET
EUC
EI
EAIR
EAGR
EIND
EWWT
ELTN
EREL
ECIN
EFIS
EINT
EC
ECONEFIN
ENVR
ECA
ELN
EFTA
EXTERNAL
EINVETC
ENIV
EINN
ENGR
EUR
ESA
ENERG
EK
ENGY
ETRO
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ENVI
ESENV
ELECTIONS
ECUN
EINVEFIN
ECIP
EINDETRD
IV
IR
IS
IZ
IAEA
IN
IT
ICTY
IQ
ICAO
INTERPOL
IPR
INRB
IRAJ
INRA
INRO
IO
IC
ID
IIP
ITPHUM
IWC
ISRAELI
IRAQI
ICRC
IMO
IF
ILC
IEFIN
INTELSAT
IL
IA
IBRD
IMF
INR
IRC
ITALY
ITALIAN
KGIC
KDEM
KTIP
KOMC
KNNP
KWBG
KU
KPAL
KGHG
KAWK
KISL
KPAO
KHLS
KSUM
KSPR
KJUS
KCRM
KGCC
KPIN
KDRG
KTFN
KG
KBIO
KHIV
KSCA
KN
KS
KCOR
KZ
KE
KFRD
KIPR
KPKO
KNUC
KMDR
KPLS
KOLY
KUNR
KIRF
KIRC
KACT
KRAD
KCOM
KMCA
KV
KHDP
KVPR
KDEV
KWMN
KMPI
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCFC
KTIA
KPRP
KAWC
KCIP
KCFE
KOCI
KTDB
KMRS
KLIG
KBCT
KICC
KGIT
KSTC
KPAK
KNEI
KSEP
KPOA
KFLU
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KO
KTER
KHUM
KRFD
KBTR
KDDG
KWWMN
KFLO
KSAF
KBTS
KPRV
KNPP
KNAR
KWMM
KERG
KFIN
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KTBT
KCRS
KRVC
KSTH
KREL
KNSD
KTEX
KPAI
KHSA
KR
KPWR
KWAC
KMIG
KSEC
KIFR
KDEMAF
MOPS
MARR
MNUC
MX
MASS
MCAP
MO
MIL
MTCRE
ML
MR
MZ
MPOS
MOPPS
MTCR
MAPP
MU
MY
MA
MG
MASC
MCC
MEPP
MK
MTRE
MP
MDC
MAR
MEPI
MRCRE
MI
MT
MQADHAFI
MD
MAPS
MUCN
MASSMNUC
MERCOSUR
MC
OVIP
OPDC
OPRC
OIIP
OFFICIALS
OSAC
OAS
OEXC
ODIP
OREP
OFDP
OTRA
OSCE
OPIC
OECD
OPCW
OSCI
OIE
OIC
OTR
OVP
PARM
PREL
PTER
PHUM
PGOV
PINR
PINS
PREF
PK
PE
PBTS
POGOV
PROP
PINL
PL
POL
PBIO
PSOE
PHSA
PKFK
PO
PGOF
PA
PARMS
PORG
PM
PMIL
PTERE
PF
PALESTINIAN
PY
PGGV
PNR
POV
PAK
PAO
PFOR
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PRGOV
PNAT
PROV
PEL
PINF
PGOVE
POLINT
PRL
PRAM
PMAR
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
PHUS
PHUMPREL
POLITICS
PEPR
PSI
PINT
PU
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PECON
SOCI
SY
SENV
SA
SP
SNAR
SG
SCUL
SR
STEINBERG
SF
SW
SU
SL
SMIG
SO
SN
SHUM
SZ
SYR
ST
SANC
SC
SAN
SIPRS
SK
SH
SI
TS
TU
TX
TBIO
TW
TSPA
TH
TIP
TI
TRGY
TC
TR
TT
TERRORISM
TO
TFIN
TD
TSPL
TZ
TPHY
TK
TNGD
TINT
TRSY
TP
UK
UN
US
UNGA
UNSC
UNO
UNMIK
UV
UY
UP
UG
USEU
USUN
UZ
UNESCO
UE
UAE
UNEP
USTR
UNHCR
UNDP
UNHRC
USAID
UNCHS
UNAUS
UNCHC
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09MANAMA679, SCENESETTER FOR MANAMA DIALOGUE, DECEMBER 11-13
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09MANAMA679.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09MANAMA679 | 2009-12-02 13:01 | 2011-02-18 21:09 | SECRET | Embassy Manama |
VZCZCXRO5273
RR RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDIR
DE RUEHMK #0679/01 3361305
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 021305Z DEC 09 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA
TO RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9037
RHBVAKS/COMUSNAVCENT
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 MANAMA 000679
SIPDIS
CENTCOM FOR GENERAL PETRAEUS FROM AMBASSADOR ERELI
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2019
TAGS: OVIP PGOV PREL KDEM MARR BA
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR MANAMA DIALOGUE, DECEMBER 11-13
REF: A. MANAMA 660 B. MANAMA 628 C. MANAMA 651 Classified By: CDA Christopher Henzel for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1.(C) General Petraeus, you will arrive in Bahrain at a time of introspection for the Bahraini regime as this year's IISS Manama Dialogue coincides with the tenth anniversary of King Hamad's accession to the throne, on December 17, 1999. During those ten years, the political and security situation has improved considerably. Our challenge is to help the Bahrainis keep things moving in the right direction, a task made considerably easier by a forward-looking and sympathetic leadeRship. --------------------------- TEN YEARS OF TRANSFORMATION ---------------------------
2.(C) Following the death of his father, Emir Isa bin Salman Al Khalifa in 1999, Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa inherited a country torn by sectarian violence and accustomed to dealing with the Shia majority underclass as a policing problem. He quickly embarked on a program of reform and reconciliation with Bahrain's Shia: he allowed exiles to return home, abolished the State Security Courts, and restored the parliament suspended since 1975. King Hamad understands that political stability is also tied to economic prosperity, and has undertaken far-reaching economic reforms intended to increase Bahrain's competitiveness, productivity and living standards. The result is that the Bahrain of today is a far cry from the Bahrain of the 1990s. Political parties operate freely and are preparing for a third parliamentary election cycle in 2010 (ref A). Street protests are significantly fewer and less violent. Perhaps most tellingly, the leader of the mainstream Shia Wifaq party has told us unequivocally that Wifaq will continue to engage in parliamentary politics because he believes there is more to gain in the long run by participating than by boycotting. ------------------------------------ REGIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY ------------------------------------
3.(C) A graduate of the Mons Officer Cadet School and the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, King Hamad takes a leading role in directing Bahrain's security policy, and carries the title of Supreme Commander. During his three decades as Crown Prince, he personally built the Bahrain Defense Force from the ground up, relying heavily on U.S. equipment and training. King Hamad believes that the peace and prosperity of the Gulf is a result of U.S. protection and friendship. The U.S. Fifth Fleet is based in Bahrain and two U.S. Patriot batteries are also stationed here. Bahrain's leaders are thus strong and outspoken proponents of a close and enduring security relationship between the United States and the region.
4.(C) Bahrain was designated a Major Non-NATO Ally in 2002, and King Hamad believes it is important that Bahrain do its part in support of regional security. In March 2008, Bahrain became the first Arab country to take command of CTF-152, one of the coalition's naval task forces in the Persian Gulf. They have also deployed as part of the CTF-151 anti-piracy mission in the Arabian Sea. On December 16, King Hamad will personally see off a company of Bahraini Special Security Forces, who will be departing to serve as part of coalition operations in Afghanistan. This activism marks Bahrain as a leader among GCC states and has encouraged others such as the UAE and Saudi Arabia to become more involved.
5.(C) King Hamad views an activist foreign policy as essential for a small state like Bahrain that wants its interests to be considered in the region. He chose the forward-leaning Khalid bin Ahmed Al Khalifa as his foreign minister. In June, Crown Prince Salman bin Hamad Al Khalifa penned a Washington Post op-ed in which he called on Arab leaders to engage with the Israeli people in support of the Arab Peace Initiative. Shortly thereafter, Bahraini officials traveled to Tel Aviv to bring back several Bahrainis who had been aboard a relief ship that was taken into Israeli custody when it tried to enter Gaza. Even modest steps in the direction of Israel set off criticism from local media and from members of parliament decrying "normalization." Recently, MPs in the elected (and Islamist-dominated) lower house voted to criminalize any contact with Israel or Israeli citizens (ref B) even though MANAMA 00000679 002 OF 003 most recognized that the (appointed) upper house will ensure the bill never becomes law.
6.(C) Bahrain was one of the first Gulf states to reopen its embassy in Baghdad, and, while wary of the Maliki government, has reached out to Iraq politically and economically. Bahraini airlines now fly regularly to several Iraqi cities. The King has established a relationship with Sayyid Ammar Al Hakim, chairman of the Supreme Islamic Council in Iraq. During Hakim's recent visit to Bahrain (ref C), King Hamad asked for his support in channeling the energies of Bahraini Shia in a positive direction, and told Hakim that he would do what he could to get the Saudis to engage with Iraq. Bahrain maintains correct relations with Iran, but has no illusions about the threat it poses to the region. Bahrain quietly supports international pressure on Iran, and consulting with the leadership will ensure that we maintain that support. ---------------- POLITICAL VISION ----------------
7.(C) King Hamad understands that Bahrain cannot prosper if he rules by repression. Bahrain's civil society is active and is engaged with Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) programming. There is more religious freedom in Bahrain than in most neighboring countries; Sunni and Shia mosques stand alongside Christian churches and Hindu temples. The National Charter (e.g., constitution) won approval in a 2000 referendum and restored the parliament that had been suspended in 1975. Two election cycles have seen the integration of the Shia opposition into the political process. While a Shia rejectionist fringe continues to boycott the process, their influence remains limited as the mainstream Wifaq party has shown an ability to work with the government to achieve results for its constituents. Discrimination against Shia persists, however, and the government has sought to deflect criticism by engaging with Wifaq and focusing more public spending on housing and social welfare projects. So long as Wifaq remains convinced of the benefits of political participation, the long-term outlook for Bahrain's stability is good. ------------------------ COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS ------------------------
8.(S) The 2004 withdrawal of U.S. Navy dependents represented the nadir in our counterterrorism relationship. Since then, the government has enacted a tough, new CT law and has used it to obtain several convictions against Al Qaeda financiers and facilitators. Much of that success is connected to the King's installation of new, more capable leadership at both the Ministry of Interior (MOI) and the Bahrain National Security Agency (BNSA) in 2006 and 2008, respectively. BNSA routinely shares high-quality intel and seeks out joint operations opportunities. MOI has proven itself highly capable of maintaining internal security. The U.S. is contributing to the CT mission through the provision of a coastal radar system via Section 1206 funding that will give Bahrain (and the U.S. Navy) a 360 degree field of vision around the island. --------------- ECONOMIC VISION ---------------
9.(C) Unlike its neighbors, Bahrain is not blessed with abundant oil and gas, and so has diversified its economy, establishing itself as the world's leading center for Islamic banking and finance. This sector generates just over one quarter of domestic GDP. Bahrain also boasts a strong regional tourism sector that accounts for a significant portion of GDP. The country produces approximately 35,000 barrels/day of oil, which is all refined locally, and 1.2 billion standard cubic feet/day of gas, which is all consumed domestically. In order to maintain economic growth, Bahrain must find additional sources of energy. The government has sought cheap gas from both Saudi Arabia and Qatar to no avail, and is currently engaged in slow-rolling talks with Iran. Contacts have asserted that discussions with Iran are aimed at getting the Saudis and Qataris off the dime.
10.(C) Bahrain has also expressed long-term interest in nuclear power, and in March, 2008 signed a memorandum of undetstnding with the U.S. on civilian nuclear cooperation. It has joined the IAEA and has deposited its Safeguards Agreement with that organization. The Government of Bahrain MANAMA 00000679 003 OF 003 has formed an inter-ministerial committee to study the use of nuclear energy for power generation, and although the GOB recognizes that they do not have the resources to develop or operate a nuclear reactor on their own, they need the power and are interested in moving forward, ideally with an American commercial partner.
11.(U) In August 2006, the U.S.-Bahrain Free Trade Agreement entered into force -- the culmination of a multiyear effort to open and reform Bahrain's economy. (In 2009, the Heritage Foundation and Wall Street Journal ranked Bahrain as the freest economy in the Middle East, and the 16th freest in the world). Since the FTA went into effect, total bilateral trade has increased more than 25%. Bahrain recently rolled out its "Economic Vision 2030" plan, a statement of the GOB's aspirations for Bahrain's economy, government and society. The plan establishes broad goals of economic diversification and the construction of a strong middle-class as the basis for Bahrain's future. ---------------- LEADERSHIP STYLE ----------------
12.(C) King Hamad is personable and engaging. He rules as something of a "corporate king," giving direction and letting his top people manage the government. He has overseen the development of strong institutions with the restoration of parliament, the formation of a legal political opposition, and a dynamic press. He is gradually shifting power from his uncle, Prime Minister Khalifa bin Salman Al Khalifa, who remains the head of the government, to his son, the Crown Prince. CrownP5,Q3a,*vQith respect to economic and labor reforms designed to combat corruption and modernize Bahrain's economic base. King Hamad is committed to fighting corruption and prefers doing business with American firms because they are transparent. U.S. companies have won major contracts in the past two years, including: Gulf Air's purchase of 24 Boeing 787 Dreamliners, a USD 5 billion joint-venture with Occidental Petroleum to revitalize the Awali field, and well over USD 300 million in Foreign Military Sales. -------------------- MILITARY COOPERATION --------------------
13.(S) The Bahrainis are delighted to have their shared early warning voice line operational. They also look forward to having the CENTRIX based system in the very near future. We also expect them to welcome the deployment of a TPY-2 Ballistic Missile Radar to Bahrain. We understand that deployment could happen as early as February 2010, but we have not yet approached the GOB to discuss this possibility.
14.(S) As you know the King approved the movement of P-3 operations to Isa Air Base next year. A detailed briefing on that movement will be presented to the BDF as soon as we can synchronize schedules with the appropriate BDF leaders. We are also working closely with the BDF to finalize an Implementing Agreement for the bed-down of the 2 Patriot Batteries in Bahrain. A draft agreement is being reviewed by the BDF and we hope to have it signed by mid-December.
15.(U) While the counter-piracy deployment conducted by the Frigate Sabha was very short (approximately 30 days), the extensive ship repairs and crew workup, done in preparation, represent a significant commitment for the BDF and they consider the deployment to have been successful with the Bahraini crew having conducted at least one stop and search operation on a suspicious vessel. The two Mk-V Fast Patrol Boats that were purchased with 1206 funds are scheduled for delivery in mid-December of this year. HENZEL