Currently released so far... 5267 / 251,287
Articles
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Amsterdam
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Browse by tag
AF
ASEC
AR
AORC
AJ
AM
AMGT
AE
AU
AGMT
AG
AS
AFIN
APER
ABUD
ATRN
AL
AEMR
ACOA
AO
AX
AMED
ADCO
AODE
AFFAIRS
AC
ASIG
ABLD
AA
AFU
ASUP
AROC
ATFN
AVERY
APCS
AER
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AEC
APECO
CU
CO
CH
CDG
CIA
CACM
CDB
CI
CS
CVIS
CA
CBW
CASC
CD
CV
CMGT
CLINTON
CE
CJAN
CG
CF
CN
CAN
COUNTER
CIS
CM
CONDOLEEZZA
COE
CR
CY
CTM
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CPAS
CWC
CT
CKGR
CB
CACS
COM
CJUS
CARSON
CL
COUNTERTERRORISM
EG
ECON
ETTC
EFIN
EZ
ETRD
EUN
ELAB
EU
EINV
EAID
EMIN
ENRG
ECPS
EN
ER
ET
ES
EPET
EUC
EI
EAIR
EAGR
EIND
EWWT
ELTN
EREL
ECIN
EFIS
EINT
EC
ECONEFIN
ENVR
ECA
ELN
EFTA
EXTERNAL
EINVETC
ENIV
EINN
ENGR
EUR
ESA
ENERG
EK
ENGY
ETRO
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ENVI
ESENV
ELECTIONS
ECUN
EINVEFIN
ECIP
EINDETRD
IV
IR
IS
IZ
IAEA
IN
IT
ICTY
IQ
ICAO
INTERPOL
IPR
INRB
IRAJ
INRA
INRO
IO
IC
ID
IIP
ITPHUM
IWC
ISRAELI
IRAQI
ICRC
IMO
IF
ILC
IEFIN
INTELSAT
IL
IA
IBRD
IMF
INR
IRC
ITALY
ITALIAN
KGIC
KDEM
KTIP
KOMC
KNNP
KWBG
KU
KPAL
KGHG
KAWK
KISL
KPAO
KHLS
KSUM
KSPR
KJUS
KCRM
KGCC
KPIN
KDRG
KTFN
KG
KBIO
KHIV
KSCA
KN
KS
KCOR
KZ
KE
KFRD
KIPR
KPKO
KNUC
KMDR
KPLS
KOLY
KUNR
KIRF
KIRC
KACT
KRAD
KCOM
KMCA
KV
KHDP
KVPR
KDEV
KWMN
KMPI
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCFC
KTIA
KPRP
KAWC
KCIP
KCFE
KOCI
KTDB
KMRS
KLIG
KBCT
KICC
KGIT
KSTC
KPAK
KNEI
KSEP
KPOA
KFLU
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KO
KTER
KHUM
KRFD
KBTR
KDDG
KWWMN
KFLO
KSAF
KBTS
KPRV
KNPP
KNAR
KWMM
KERG
KFIN
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KTBT
KCRS
KRVC
KSTH
KREL
KNSD
KTEX
KPAI
KHSA
KR
KPWR
KWAC
KMIG
KSEC
KIFR
KDEMAF
MOPS
MARR
MNUC
MX
MASS
MCAP
MO
MIL
MTCRE
ML
MR
MZ
MPOS
MOPPS
MTCR
MAPP
MU
MY
MA
MG
MASC
MCC
MEPP
MK
MTRE
MP
MDC
MAR
MEPI
MRCRE
MI
MT
MQADHAFI
MD
MAPS
MUCN
MASSMNUC
MERCOSUR
MC
OVIP
OPDC
OPRC
OIIP
OFFICIALS
OSAC
OAS
OEXC
ODIP
OREP
OFDP
OTRA
OSCE
OPIC
OECD
OPCW
OSCI
OIE
OIC
OTR
OVP
PARM
PREL
PTER
PHUM
PGOV
PINR
PINS
PREF
PK
PE
PBTS
POGOV
PROP
PINL
PL
POL
PBIO
PSOE
PHSA
PKFK
PO
PGOF
PA
PARMS
PORG
PM
PMIL
PTERE
PF
PALESTINIAN
PY
PGGV
PNR
POV
PAK
PAO
PFOR
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PRGOV
PNAT
PROV
PEL
PINF
PGOVE
POLINT
PRL
PRAM
PMAR
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
PHUS
PHUMPREL
POLITICS
PEPR
PSI
PINT
PU
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PECON
SOCI
SY
SENV
SA
SP
SNAR
SG
SCUL
SR
STEINBERG
SF
SW
SU
SL
SMIG
SO
SN
SHUM
SZ
SYR
ST
SANC
SC
SAN
SIPRS
SK
SH
SI
TS
TU
TX
TBIO
TW
TSPA
TH
TIP
TI
TRGY
TC
TR
TT
TERRORISM
TO
TFIN
TD
TSPL
TZ
TPHY
TK
TNGD
TINT
TRSY
TP
UK
UN
US
UNGA
UNSC
UNO
UNMIK
UV
UY
UP
UG
USEU
USUN
UZ
UNESCO
UE
UAE
UNEP
USTR
UNHCR
UNDP
UNHRC
USAID
UNCHS
UNAUS
UNCHC
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 08LONDON2283, IRAN: UK'S INFORMAL COMMENTS ON EU DYNAMICS AND IRAN SANCTIONS PROSPECTS REF: A. SECSTATE 95257 B. SEPT 2 LONDON EMAIL (GAYLE) TO NEA/IR
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08LONDON2283.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
08LONDON2283 | 2008-09-09 16:04 | 2011-02-04 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy London |
VZCZCXRO8737
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
DE RUEHLO #2283/01 2531606
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 091606Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9688
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 002283
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/09/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL KNNP IR UK
SUBJECT: IRAN: UK'S INFORMAL COMMENTS ON EU DYNAMICS AND IRAN SANCTIONS PROSPECTS REF: A. SECSTATE 95257 B. SEPT 2 LONDON EMAIL (GAYLE) TO NEA/IR
Classified By: Political Counselor Rick Mills for reasons 1.4 (b) and ( d)
¶1. (C) Summary: Recent Embassy conversations on Iran with regular Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) contacts suggest the UK's approach on Iran nuclear policy will continue to be tough-minded and practical, favoring direct engagement if feasible, but not optimistic on prospects either for broad EU support for further Iran sanctions or for a near-term change in Iran's stance. FCO Iran Coordinator and another FCO Iran officer separately commented on EU/P5 1 dynamics, German reluctance, FCO's view of Khamenei's cooling support for Ahmedinejad, and the large economic potential, but limited diplomatic time frame, in which expanded sanctions could work. End Summary.
U.S./UK Still Agree: Need More Pressure, More Sanctions -----------------------------
¶2. (C) During a courtesy call by newly arrived Political Minister-Counselor, accompanied by London Iran Watcher (Poloff), FCO Iran Coordinator Antony Phillipson covered familiar ground, noting both USG and HMG remain close partners on the urgent need to increase pressure on the regime via new sanctions. UK leadership had helped produce a broad package of EU sanctions August 7, Phillipson said, with EU work to implement that package now going forward.
Real Target Is UAE; Only Five EU Members Are Serious on Iran; Elusive Impact of Sanctions --------------------------------------------
¶3. (C) Phillipson also provided his personal assessments on Iran policy and prospects. P5 1/Multilateral/Collective Efforts: -- Phillipson sounded a hopeful note on the replacement of Russian political director Kislyak's replacement by Sergey Ryabkov; Phillipson said FCO's view is that Ryabkov is said to be "very pragmatic" and "as good as they come;" -- P5 1 efforts should now focus on a "coalition of the willing," which Phillipson said now consists of Spain, Italy, France, UK, Germany, and the U.S.; and -- The real target for those wanting effective international cooperation is the UAE; Phillipson argued the problem of Dubai transshipments to Iran is a function of both technical incapacity as well as lack of political will, with both factors of roughly equal importance. Iran internal: -- Phillipson said Khamenei's recent comments to Ahmedinejad, that he should plan, as the President, beyond 2008, were in HMG eyes intended less as an endorsement of a second term for Ahmedinejad than as a request that the current president should make policy according to Iran's longer term interests, rather than according to shorter term tactical considerations. Sanctions: -- Phillipson believes the economic impact of sanctions should be measured not only directly but also in terms of opportunity costs (e.g., foreign direct investment would be enormous but for sanctions). At the same time, Phillipson argued economic and even diplomatic opportunity costs are still poorly understood by Iranians themselves; -- He quoted with apparent approval former National Security Advisor Tony Lake as saying the U.S. will "sharpen the choices" for Iran, and said the purpose of sanctions is to compel the regime to engage directly, with enrichment suspension being the vital prerequisite; -- The long-term internal consequences of engagement are a great unknown for the regime, which is focused on its own survival; -- Hydrocarbons sanctions, beginning with LNG, must in HMG view be on the table; Phillipson said hydrocarbons are central to core regime equities and calculations; -- But Phillipson also gave a gloomy personal assessment that the P5 1 has "about twelve months," after which "many (Phillipson declined to be more specific) will begin to LONDON 00002283 002 OF 002 consider other options;" he opined twelve months is not enough time for a complete range of sanctions options to develop and have their full economic and political effect.
German Reluctance: Not A Temporary Condition --------------------------------------------
¶4. (C) Separately, FCO Iran Coordination Group's Sanctions Officer Neil Kernohan on September 8 commented at length on the negative impact German hesitation is having on prospects for further EU sanctions on Iran. Kernohan's comments came during Poloff's call to deliver USG demarche (ref a), with which HMG fully agrees, on Polish and Croatian oil investments.
¶5. (C) Kernohan pointed to hydrocarbon investment and reinsurance as the areas where HMG wants to push the EU hardest for new sanctions. He said, however, FCO fears Germany may soon draw a firm, final line on further EU action, limiting it to the extent of existing UNSC action and authority, and no more. Kernohan opined that a variety of factors seem to produce chronic German reluctance inside EU deliberations: commercial interests, infighting within German ministries, and a fundamental unwillingness to use the institution of the EU in a forward-leaning way.
¶6. (C) Kernohan said he was not optimistic there will be sufficient consensus within the E3 on Iran to enable an effective push against Chinese or Russian reluctance within the P5 1 on the margins of UNGA meetings this month.
Comment -------
¶7. (C) Part of the FCO Iran Coordination Group's brief is to manage the expectations of its closest ally, the United States; FCO therefore can be expected to magnify the difficulties it faces in leading 27 EU member governments toward coherence on Iran. The FCO's evident cumulative fatigue as it continues to channel the EU's Iran deliberations, however, suggests any further EU expansion of Iran sanctions may be a long slog with limited results, with continuing, visible USG support and appreciation for UK efforts a key to success. Visit London's Classified Website: XXXXXXXXXXXX
TUTTLE