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courage is contagious
Viewing cable 05THEHAGUE406, YOUR MEETING WITH DUTCH FOREIGN MINISTER BOT
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
05THEHAGUE406 | 2005-02-11 11:11 | 2011-01-22 21:09 | SECRET | Embassy The Hague |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 THE HAGUE 000406
SIPDIS
TO THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR SOBEL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2025
TAGS: PREL NL EUN NATO
SUBJECT: YOUR MEETING WITH DUTCH FOREIGN MINISTER BOT
REF: THE HAGUE 3350 (2004)
Classified By: AMBASSADOR CLIFFORD SOBEL FOR REASONS 1.4(B) and (D).
Madame Secretary:
¶1. (C) Foreign Minister Bot requested this meeting to discuss
a wide range of U.S.-EU issues prior to the President's visit
to Europe. A former Dutch permrep to the EU with a
pro-European reputation, Bot's appreciation of the
transatlantic relationship appears to have deepened and
strengthened during the six months of the Dutch EU
presidency. On several key issues -- e.g. Iraq, Ukraine,
China, Turkey -- Bot leveraged his understanding of European
politics and institutions to advance a solidly transatlantic
agenda. His candid assessments of internal European
decision-making at critical moments also proved invaluable.
Bot very much wants to remain a player, and is seeking to
stake out a clear role for the Dutch (and for himself) in the
post-Presidency environment. Although we have had our recent
-- over the Dutch withdrawal from al-Muthanna, for example
-- this meeting provides an excellent opportunity to take
advantage of Bot's credibility and experience to refine our
message to Europe, while encouraging Bot to assume a more
active leadership role in key areas.
IRAQ:
----
¶2. (C) Bot personally made Iraq a high priority during the
Dutch EU Presidency. He should continue to press the EU from
within to assume greater responsibilities in Iraq, and to
move quickly to establish a physical presence on the ground
in particular. The decision -- which Bot fought in cabinet
-- to withdraw the Dutch bilateral military presence from
al-Muthanna next month is unfortunately irreversible. The
Dutch were among the first, however, to commit personnel to
the first phase of the NATO training mission and have
indicated a willingness to provide up to 100 in later phases
-- with the caveat that they expect other partners to provide
similar numbers. It would be useful to remind Bot that while
we appreciate Dutch efforts to press allies to be more
forthcoming, basing Dutch contributions on strict definitions
of proportionality would be counterproductive.
¶3. (C) The Dutch have never ruled out additional missions in
Iraq, and Bot in particular may be receptive to ideas for how
the Dutch could fill important niches For example, The
Dutch could be asked to consider expanding bilateral support
to Iraqi institutions such as the Ministries of Foreign
Affairs (the Dutch are currently training one class of junior
Iraqi diplomats in the Hague) and Justice (the Dutch last
year hosted a successful conference of Iraqi jurists in The
Hague) or to sponsor specific reconstruction and development
projects in the al-Muthanna area to take advantage of
existing links to the local community.
CHINA ARMS EMBARGO:
------------------
¶4. (C) Bot started the Dutch presidency resigned to lifting
the China Arms Embargo, but ended it determined to prevent a
lift on his watch. He can continue to provide useful
insights into how the issue is being handled within EU
circles, and should be pushed to keep the EU focused on its
commitment -- which the Dutch insisted on inserting into the
December 17 Council declaration -- not to increase sales to
China in quantity or quality. The Dutch have made clear
that they will take their lead on this issue from the
British, and that they will not stand alone to prevent a
lift, but they may be able to help us find and exploit
potential cracks in the EU's consensus. Bot should also be
left with no illusions about the likely consequences of a
lift, including potential complications in U.S.-European
defense trade.
CUBA:
----
¶5. (C) The Dutch continue to represent the EU Presidency in
Havana (since Luxembourg has no mission there) and have deep
concerns about the human rights situation there. The Dutch
have so far not been as active as the Czechs or Poles in
pressing the EU to maintain contacts with dissidents as it
improves relations with Havana; Bot could and should do more
in this area. For example, he could instruct the Dutch
Embassy in Havana to respond positively to our request that
US representatives be invited to the monthly coordination
meetings on human rights held by EU missions in Havana.
TURKEY/CYPRUS:
-------------
¶6. (C) As a former Ambassador to Turkey, and the man under
whose watch the Turks finally got a date to begin accession
talks, Bot has a personal interest in facilitating Turkey's
bid to accede to the EU. The Dutch MFA plans to establish a
regular bilateral forum for discussing EU accession issues
with Turkey along the lines of their previous successful
relationship with Poland; this relationship may prove useful
in identifying and resolving problems ad October 3
approaches. The Dutch can also provide useful insights into
EU thinking regarding Cyprus, and are keenly aware that a
failure to resolve the current impasse over Berlin-plus has
serious implications for NATO.
ICC/SUDAN:
---------
¶7. (C) We will have little success convincing Bot to break
from EU consensus to support an AU/UN tribunal on Darfur as
long as the ICC remains an option in European eyes; as the
host of the ICC, the Dutch are uniquely committed to seeing
it succeed. We can, however, ask Bot to tone down the
rhetoric and activities of Dutch representatives in New York,
Brussels, and elsewhere opposing alternatives to the ICC. As
a pragmatist, Bot should understand that a public spat over
this issue does nothing either to promote the transatlantic
agenda or to bring the perpetrators to justice. The Dutch,
and Bot personally, have been heavily involved in Darfur (the
Dutch, for example, paid over half of the EU's contribution
to the AU mission) and do not want to jeopardize a potential
resolution over technicalities.
AFGHANISTAN:
-----------
¶8. (S) In the debate over the al-Muthanna withdrawal, the
Dutch government cited commitments in Afghanistan --
including a possible deployment of special forces to OEF and
heading up a new PRT in phase III -- as one reason for
leaving Iraq. These commitments are substantial, useful, and
appropriate, but you may want to set down a marker that they
should not be used to justify seen as substitutes for
contributions in Iraq -- both are high priorities. The Dutch
have also recently expressed public interest in deploying the
Dutch battalion of the SRF to Afghanistan to support upcoming
elections, but have balked at deploying the more substantial
Dutch NRF forces (approximately 4,000 troops.) NATO has not
yet determined which force, if either, should be deployed for
this mission, but Dutch efforts to predetermine the outcome
are not helpful.
MIDDLE EAST:
-----------
¶9. (C) Last November, Bot was eager to transform his
successful hosting of the EUROMED conference in the Hague
into a a prominent role in the Middle East Peace Process. So
far, however, he has been unable to carve out an appropriate
role for himself or the Netherlands either within the EU or
bilaterally. Bot correctly judges that there is broad public
support (including from the main opposition parties in
parliament) for increased engagement in the Middle East, but
he will not insert himself into the process without being
asked.
AFRICA:
------
¶10. (C) Already heavily involved in Africa -- the Dutch are
the fourth largest donor of aid to the continent -- Bot is
under constant pressure from the Dutch parliament (and Dutch
development minister Agnes van Ardenne) to do more. The
Dutch uniquely include a major focus on peace and security in
their African development policy, and have expressed interest
in greater coordination with the U.S., especially in the Horn
and Great Lakes Regions. In fleshing out possible areas of
increased cooperation in Africa, we should remain cognizant
of the fact that African initiatives have sometimes been
portrayed as alternatives to missions in Iraq or Afghanistan;
we will need to make clear in any discussion where our top
priorities lie.
BOTTOM LINE:
-----------
¶11. (C) Bot's experience and credibility make him a useful
European interlocutor and an effective advocate for the
transatlantic agenda. During the Dutch presidency, he
repeatedly demonstrated a talent for translating
transatlantic objectives into the language of Europeanism,
and for discreetly managing difficult issues (such as Turkey
or China) to successful conclusions. It would be in our
interest to find creative ways to harness his skills as a
coalition builder and his newly-deepened transatlantic
orientation in the post-presidency environment as well.
¶12. (C) One final point you may want to stress in your
discussion is that the concept of proportionality creeping
into many Dutch debates (on Iraq and Afghanistan, for
example) is misguided. The value we place on our partnership
is not based on whether or not the Dutch contribute their
fair share to any given operation, but rather reflects the
trust developed over a long history in which each side
demonstrated its willingness to do whatever was needed to
achieve shared objectives.
SOBEL