Currently released so far... 5267 / 251,287
Articles
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Amsterdam
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Browse by tag
AF
ASEC
AR
AORC
AJ
AM
AMGT
AE
AU
AGMT
AG
AS
AFIN
APER
ABUD
ATRN
AL
AEMR
ACOA
AO
AX
AMED
ADCO
AODE
AFFAIRS
AC
ASIG
ABLD
AA
AFU
ASUP
AROC
ATFN
AVERY
APCS
AER
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AEC
APECO
CU
CO
CH
CDG
CIA
CACM
CDB
CI
CS
CVIS
CA
CBW
CASC
CD
CV
CMGT
CLINTON
CE
CJAN
CG
CF
CN
CAN
COUNTER
CIS
CM
CONDOLEEZZA
COE
CR
CY
CTM
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CPAS
CWC
CT
CKGR
CB
CACS
COM
CJUS
CARSON
CL
COUNTERTERRORISM
EG
ECON
ETTC
EFIN
EZ
ETRD
EUN
ELAB
EU
EINV
EAID
EMIN
ENRG
ECPS
EN
ER
ET
ES
EPET
EUC
EI
EAIR
EAGR
EIND
EWWT
ELTN
EREL
ECIN
EFIS
EINT
EC
ECONEFIN
ENVR
ECA
ELN
EFTA
EXTERNAL
EINVETC
ENIV
EINN
ENGR
EUR
ESA
ENERG
EK
ENGY
ETRO
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ENVI
ESENV
ELECTIONS
ECUN
EINVEFIN
ECIP
EINDETRD
IV
IR
IS
IZ
IAEA
IN
IT
ICTY
IQ
ICAO
INTERPOL
IPR
INRB
IRAJ
INRA
INRO
IO
IC
ID
IIP
ITPHUM
IWC
ISRAELI
IRAQI
ICRC
IMO
IF
ILC
IEFIN
INTELSAT
IL
IA
IBRD
IMF
INR
IRC
ITALY
ITALIAN
KGIC
KDEM
KTIP
KOMC
KNNP
KWBG
KU
KPAL
KGHG
KAWK
KISL
KPAO
KHLS
KSUM
KSPR
KJUS
KCRM
KGCC
KPIN
KDRG
KTFN
KG
KBIO
KHIV
KSCA
KN
KS
KCOR
KZ
KE
KFRD
KIPR
KPKO
KNUC
KMDR
KPLS
KOLY
KUNR
KIRF
KIRC
KACT
KRAD
KCOM
KMCA
KV
KHDP
KVPR
KDEV
KWMN
KMPI
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCFC
KTIA
KPRP
KAWC
KCIP
KCFE
KOCI
KTDB
KMRS
KLIG
KBCT
KICC
KGIT
KSTC
KPAK
KNEI
KSEP
KPOA
KFLU
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KO
KTER
KHUM
KRFD
KBTR
KDDG
KWWMN
KFLO
KSAF
KBTS
KPRV
KNPP
KNAR
KWMM
KERG
KFIN
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KTBT
KCRS
KRVC
KSTH
KREL
KNSD
KTEX
KPAI
KHSA
KR
KPWR
KWAC
KMIG
KSEC
KIFR
KDEMAF
MOPS
MARR
MNUC
MX
MASS
MCAP
MO
MIL
MTCRE
ML
MR
MZ
MPOS
MOPPS
MTCR
MAPP
MU
MY
MA
MG
MASC
MCC
MEPP
MK
MTRE
MP
MDC
MAR
MEPI
MRCRE
MI
MT
MQADHAFI
MD
MAPS
MUCN
MASSMNUC
MERCOSUR
MC
OVIP
OPDC
OPRC
OIIP
OFFICIALS
OSAC
OAS
OEXC
ODIP
OREP
OFDP
OTRA
OSCE
OPIC
OECD
OPCW
OSCI
OIE
OIC
OTR
OVP
PARM
PREL
PTER
PHUM
PGOV
PINR
PINS
PREF
PK
PE
PBTS
POGOV
PROP
PINL
PL
POL
PBIO
PSOE
PHSA
PKFK
PO
PGOF
PA
PARMS
PORG
PM
PMIL
PTERE
PF
PALESTINIAN
PY
PGGV
PNR
POV
PAK
PAO
PFOR
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PRGOV
PNAT
PROV
PEL
PINF
PGOVE
POLINT
PRL
PRAM
PMAR
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
PHUS
PHUMPREL
POLITICS
PEPR
PSI
PINT
PU
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PECON
SOCI
SY
SENV
SA
SP
SNAR
SG
SCUL
SR
STEINBERG
SF
SW
SU
SL
SMIG
SO
SN
SHUM
SZ
SYR
ST
SANC
SC
SAN
SIPRS
SK
SH
SI
TS
TU
TX
TBIO
TW
TSPA
TH
TIP
TI
TRGY
TC
TR
TT
TERRORISM
TO
TFIN
TD
TSPL
TZ
TPHY
TK
TNGD
TINT
TRSY
TP
UK
UN
US
UNGA
UNSC
UNO
UNMIK
UV
UY
UP
UG
USEU
USUN
UZ
UNESCO
UE
UAE
UNEP
USTR
UNHCR
UNDP
UNHRC
USAID
UNCHS
UNAUS
UNCHC
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 05ANKARA82, SCENESETTER FOR JAN. 11 U.S.-TURKEY-IRAQ TALKS ON
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #05ANKARA82.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
05ANKARA82 | 2005-01-06 13:01 | 2011-02-18 00:12 | SECRET | Embassy Ankara |
Appears in these articles: http://rusrep.ru/article/2011/02/03/kurdistan/ |
P 061331Z JAN 05
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3209
INFO IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY
AMCONSUL ISTANBUL PRIORITY
HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J-3/J-5// PRIORITY
NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
ODC ANKARA TU PRIORITY
SECDEF WASHDC//USDP:PDUSDP/ISP:EUR/ISP:NESA// PRIORITY
39ABG INCIRLIK AB TU//CC// PRIORITY
425ABS IZMIR TU//CC// PRIORITY
HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
S E C R E T ANKARA 000082
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/05/2025
TAGS: MOPS PTER PREL PREF IZ TU EUN AM CY RS
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR JAN. 11 U.S.-TURKEY-IRAQ TALKS ON
PKK/KONGRA-GEL
REF: A. 04 STATE 201785 (NOTAL)
¶B. 04 STATE 2084...
S E C R E T ANKARA 000082 E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/05/2025 TAGS: MOPS PTER PREL PREF IZ TU EUN AM CY RS
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR JAN. 11 U.S.-TURKEY-IRAQ TALKS ON PKK/KONGRA-GEL REF: A. 04 STATE 201785 (NOTAL) B. 04 STATE 208448 (NOTAL) C. 03 ANKARA 6231 (NOTAL) D. 04 ANKARA 509 (NOTAL) Classified By: Ambassador Eric S. Edelman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
Summary
¶1. (C) Embassy appreciates the participation of our colleagues from Washington, Baghdad, and EUCOM in Jan. 11 trilateral (U.S.-Turkey-Iraq) talks on the PKK/Kongra-Gel. On. Jan. 5, Turkish MFA provided us with a rough outline for the talks themselves. In this message we hope to lay out what we believe are issues the U.S. side may want to consider, or perhaps propose as action items at the talks. While Kongra-Gel's command and control structure is located in northern Iraq, we should acknowledge that they use other countries for logistical and financial support. We should address these items as well, if only to point out to the Turks and the Iraqis that the issue goes beyond just their two countries. End summary.
¶2. (C) MFA Iraq Desk Director Avni Botsali told PolMilOff Jan. 5 that the GOT will not submit a written agenda for the talks. Instead, the Turkish HOD, Special Coordinator for Iraq Koruturk, will briefly introduce a TGS presentation on PKK/Kongra-Gel. The three HODs will then make opening remarks, followed by an open discussion of the issues. The Turks then hope for a set of agreed minutes. He added that the GOT hopes that at the talks the U.S. side will demonstrate serious intent to "help alleviate the frustration" many official Turks feel regarding PKK/Kongra-Gel's continuing presence in northern Iraq. He also expressed concern that--according to the Turkish Embassy in Baghdad--the IIG only seemed to be sending MFA officials to these talks. Botsali said that if the U.S. side can share any information on our plans for the talks, the Turks would be most appreciative. He believes the talks will begin between 1030 and 1100 on Jan. 11. Koruturk will offer a lunch at the appropriate time, followed by further discussion as needed. Botsali did not believe the talks would last until COB Jan. 11. The Turks will host the talks in a hotel conference room in an Ankara suburb.
¶3. (C) Turkish officials acknowledge that the insurgency has made it difficult for both MNF-I and the IIG to take kinetic action against PKK/Kongra-Gel. However, faced with a constant stream of soldiers being killed in renewed anti-PKK operations in Turkey's southeast and the deep concern among intelligence officials that the PKK has infiltrated major Turkish cities in order to open a new terrorism front, the Turks insist that we make good on our word--delivered at the highest levels--that we will act. Although the handover of sovereignty to the Iraqis more than six months ago means that the IIG is in the driver's seat on policy towards terrorists on Iraqi soil, our Turkish interlocutors still expect U.S. participation in anti-PKK actions.
PKK/Kongra-Gel in Iraq
¶4. (S) Given the apparent lack of Kongra-Gel terrorist action inside Iraq, the political challenges faced by the IIG and the security situation that has stretched the Iraqi Security Forces, it is not surprising that the IIG is reluctant to take action now. Per ref a instructions, however, we can attempt to persuade the Iraqis to take certain minimal steps to show the Turks that the IIG takes the issue seriously. Per reftel, these include: --Close the offices of the Kurdistan Democratic Solutions Party in Iraq, and declare this "party," a front for the PKK terrorist organization, illegal. --Issue arrest warrants for PKK/Kongra Gel terrorists and leaders who may be in Iraq and, when they are arrested, either return them to Turkey for prosecution or prosecute them under Iraqi law. --Join the Kurdish Regional Government in high level public statements that the IIG will not permit the PKK to operate or have safehaven in Iraq. --Begin patrolling around Makhmour camp to discourage PKK/Kongra-Gel activity in the camp.
¶5. (S) Additionally, the cable instructed Embassy Baghdad to tell the IIG: "The U.S. and MNF-I will work with you on ways to implement such actions." We need to be prepared to discuss what we are prepared to do--and when--to help operationalize this. Finally, the IIG and IECI seem prepared to permit two PKK/Kongra-Gel front parties, including the Kurdistan Democratic Solutions Party, to participate in Jan. 30 elections. This is surprising and steps to prevent it would still be appropriate.
¶6. (S) Discouraging PKK/Kongra-Gel activity around Makhmour Camp is not something to be done in a vacuum. Most residents of the camp are Turkish citizens who fled to Iraq in the 1990s during the worst of the fighting with PKK/Kongra-Gel within Turkey. While the Turks want to close the camp and bring its citizens home, it is concerned that PKK/Kongra-Gel routinely infiltrates Makhmour. In Jan. 2004, Turkey, UNHCR, and the IGC (with CPA support) negotiated an agreement to close the camp and voluntarily repatriate its residents to Turkey (ref d). The deal fell through, however, because the Turks insisted that Secretary Powell sign a letter of guarantee, including a commitment to take the steps necessary to stop PKK/Kongra-Gel infiltration. We were not then (and likely are still not) in a position to provide such a guarantee to the Turks. If the Iraqis were to provide this security (perhaps with MNF-I support), it could finally lead to the long-overdue closure of this camp and an orderly, voluntary repatriation process under UNHCR auspices.
PKK/Kongra-Gel Outside of Iraq
¶7. (S) While northern Iraq may be PKK/Kongra-Gel's main command and control center (and Turkey its main target), this terrorist organization is active in other countries. We defer to Washington's expertise, but based on our information we believe we need to be prepared to address--or perhaps offer an action plan--for dealing with the following: --PKK/Kongra-Gel presence in and utilization of Cyprus and Armenia --Russia as a transit hub or support for PKK --Ref b indicates that DoD was to provide additional information to State regarding television stations that are likely PKK/Kongra-Gel fronts, with an eye toward demarching the Belgians and Danes. Can we report progress on this issue? France closed a forerunner of Roj TV; is there information there that can help persuade the Danes? --PKK financing operations in Europe, as well as PKK front offices there --We understand that a PKK training camp was raided by the Dutch not long after the Van Gogh murder. Do we have info to share on PKK methodology and other intel we can share with Turkey and/or Iraq? --Previous U.S.-Turkish talks on the PKK (ref c) discussed the full range of tools of statecraft to be deployed against the PKK/Kongra-Gel. Any further progress we have made outside Iraq in providing intelligence and law enforcement assets per that undertaking (that we can share) would be helpful. The lists above are by no means exhaustive or complete. We hope they will be useful food for thought for addressees.
¶8. (U) Baghdad minimize considered.
EDELMAN