Currently released so far... 5267 / 251,287
Articles
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/24
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/10
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Amsterdam
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
USUN New York
USEU Brussels
US Mission Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
UNVIE
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Browse by tag
AF
ASEC
AR
AORC
AJ
AM
AMGT
AE
AU
AGMT
AG
AS
AFIN
APER
ABUD
ATRN
AL
AEMR
ACOA
AO
AX
AMED
ADCO
AODE
AFFAIRS
AC
ASIG
ABLD
AA
AFU
ASUP
AROC
ATFN
AVERY
APCS
AER
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AEC
APECO
CU
CO
CH
CDG
CIA
CACM
CDB
CI
CS
CVIS
CA
CBW
CASC
CD
CV
CMGT
CLINTON
CE
CJAN
CG
CF
CN
CAN
COUNTER
CIS
CM
CONDOLEEZZA
COE
CR
CY
CTM
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CPAS
CWC
CT
CKGR
CB
CACS
COM
CJUS
CARSON
CL
COUNTERTERRORISM
EG
ECON
ETTC
EFIN
EZ
ETRD
EUN
ELAB
EU
EINV
EAID
EMIN
ENRG
ECPS
EN
ER
ET
ES
EPET
EUC
EI
EAIR
EAGR
EIND
EWWT
ELTN
EREL
ECIN
EFIS
EINT
EC
ECONEFIN
ENVR
ECA
ELN
EFTA
EXTERNAL
EINVETC
ENIV
EINN
ENGR
EUR
ESA
ENERG
EK
ENGY
ETRO
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
ETRDEINVTINTCS
ENVI
ESENV
ELECTIONS
ECUN
EINVEFIN
ECIP
EINDETRD
IV
IR
IS
IZ
IAEA
IN
IT
ICTY
IQ
ICAO
INTERPOL
IPR
INRB
IRAJ
INRA
INRO
IO
IC
ID
IIP
ITPHUM
IWC
ISRAELI
IRAQI
ICRC
IMO
IF
ILC
IEFIN
INTELSAT
IL
IA
IBRD
IMF
INR
IRC
ITALY
ITALIAN
KGIC
KDEM
KTIP
KOMC
KNNP
KWBG
KU
KPAL
KGHG
KAWK
KISL
KPAO
KHLS
KSUM
KSPR
KJUS
KCRM
KGCC
KPIN
KDRG
KTFN
KG
KBIO
KHIV
KSCA
KN
KS
KCOR
KZ
KE
KFRD
KIPR
KPKO
KNUC
KMDR
KPLS
KOLY
KUNR
KIRF
KIRC
KACT
KRAD
KCOM
KMCA
KV
KHDP
KVPR
KDEV
KWMN
KMPI
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KCFC
KTIA
KPRP
KAWC
KCIP
KCFE
KOCI
KTDB
KMRS
KLIG
KBCT
KICC
KGIT
KSTC
KPAK
KNEI
KSEP
KPOA
KFLU
KNUP
KNNPMNUC
KO
KTER
KHUM
KRFD
KBTR
KDDG
KWWMN
KFLO
KSAF
KBTS
KPRV
KNPP
KNAR
KWMM
KERG
KFIN
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KTBT
KCRS
KRVC
KSTH
KREL
KNSD
KTEX
KPAI
KHSA
KR
KPWR
KWAC
KMIG
KSEC
KIFR
KDEMAF
MOPS
MARR
MNUC
MX
MASS
MCAP
MO
MIL
MTCRE
ML
MR
MZ
MPOS
MOPPS
MTCR
MAPP
MU
MY
MA
MG
MASC
MCC
MEPP
MK
MTRE
MP
MDC
MAR
MEPI
MRCRE
MI
MT
MQADHAFI
MD
MAPS
MUCN
MASSMNUC
MERCOSUR
MC
OVIP
OPDC
OPRC
OIIP
OFFICIALS
OSAC
OAS
OEXC
ODIP
OREP
OFDP
OTRA
OSCE
OPIC
OECD
OPCW
OSCI
OIE
OIC
OTR
OVP
PARM
PREL
PTER
PHUM
PGOV
PINR
PINS
PREF
PK
PE
PBTS
POGOV
PROP
PINL
PL
POL
PBIO
PSOE
PHSA
PKFK
PO
PGOF
PA
PARMS
PORG
PM
PMIL
PTERE
PF
PALESTINIAN
PY
PGGV
PNR
POV
PAK
PAO
PFOR
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PRGOV
PNAT
PROV
PEL
PINF
PGOVE
POLINT
PRL
PRAM
PMAR
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
PHUS
PHUMPREL
POLITICS
PEPR
PSI
PINT
PU
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PECON
SOCI
SY
SENV
SA
SP
SNAR
SG
SCUL
SR
STEINBERG
SF
SW
SU
SL
SMIG
SO
SN
SHUM
SZ
SYR
ST
SANC
SC
SAN
SIPRS
SK
SH
SI
TS
TU
TX
TBIO
TW
TSPA
TH
TIP
TI
TRGY
TC
TR
TT
TERRORISM
TO
TFIN
TD
TSPL
TZ
TPHY
TK
TNGD
TINT
TRSY
TP
UK
UN
US
UNGA
UNSC
UNO
UNMIK
UV
UY
UP
UG
USEU
USUN
UZ
UNESCO
UE
UAE
UNEP
USTR
UNHCR
UNDP
UNHRC
USAID
UNCHS
UNAUS
UNCHC
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 04BRASILIA862, FTAA: INITIAL BUENOS AIRES FALLOUT IN BRASILIA
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #04BRASILIA862.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
04BRASILIA862 | 2004-04-08 19:07 | 2011-01-12 00:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Brasilia |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 000862
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR WHA/BSC, WHA/EPSC, EB/TPP
PASS TO USTR FOR PALLGEIER, RWILSON, KLEZNY, RSMITH, SCRONIN
USDOC FOR APREACHER
USDA FOR JB PENN, U/S, FFAS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2014 TAGS: ETRD BR FTAA
SUBJECT: FTAA: INITIAL BUENOS AIRES FALLOUT IN BRASILIA
REF: BUENOS AIRES 1009
Classified By: ECONOFF JANICE FAIR FOR REASONS 1.4 (b) AND (d)
¶1. (U) Summary. Following the informal FTAA discussions in Buenos Aires March 31-April 1, which ended without agreement (reftel), Brazilian Foreign Ministry (Itamaraty) officials launched an aggressive media campaign to get the word out that U.S. intransigence was to blame for the impasse. Foreign Minister Amorim was widely quoted, claiming a U.S. pullback from the compromise achieved in the FTAA Ministerial in Miami last November. Although the level of public outrage was lower than that following the Trinidad & Tobago TNC meeting last year, the private sector and other ministries have apparently communicated to Itamaraty their consternation regarding its negotiating posture. Despite headlines heralding an end to the FTAA, high-level officials from the Ministry of Development, Industry and Trade (MDIC) informed Ambassador that the GoB has not abandoned the FTAA negotiations and is formulating new proposals, including improved market access offers. End Summary.
---------- Blame Game ----------
¶2. (U) Immediately following adjournment of the informal FTAA discussions in Buenos Aires, Itamaraty launched a media blitz to assign blame for the impasse that prevented progress in negotiating a common set of rights and obligations under the new FTAA framework. U.S., and to a lesser extent Canadian, intransigence was identified as the main culprit. In interviews and in discussions with members of Brazil's Congress, Foreign Minister Amorim accused the U.S. of trying to reopen the Miami Ministerial compromise, most probably in reference to a proposal to allow for additional provisions in the common set in the future. He reiterated Brazilian claims that the U.S. is unwillingly to provide real market access for Brazilian agricultural products, specifically in addressing domestic support and export subsidies, while it is trying to reintroduce new rules in Brazil's sensitive areas of services, investment, IPR and government procurement. As in the past, Amorim argued for moving on from the "philosophical" discussion on rules and instead beginning market access negotiations; he reaffirmed that Brazil will not negotiate services market access in any format other than bilateral. On April 7 and 8, there was widespread reporting on the contents of a letter Minister Amorim sent to USTR Zoellick on April 5, outlining GoB concerns with U.S. positions within the common set negotiations.
¶3. (U) Similar commentary was attributed to Regis Arslanian and Tovar da Silva Nunes, Director General of Itamaraty's Trade Negotiations Department, and Head of its FTAA Division, respectively. In addition to bemoaning the lack of U.S. flexibility, Nunes asserted to journalists that the outcome of the Buenos Aires talks had prompted Itamaraty to shift its trade policy focus toward negotiation of agreements with some 30 developing countries, with the EU, and toward WTO trade talks. Negotiations with the EU were singled out as exemplifying a more collaborative process than the FTAA and a higher probability of success, a questionable assertion. Striking a more balanced tone, Amorim told Brazilian Deputies on April 6 that the GoB plans to focus more on the WTO negotiations, unwilling to concede anything within the regional FTAA or bi-regional EU agreements that would undermine Brazil's interests within the global trade talks.
---------------------------------------- Not Everyone is On Board with Itamaraty ----------------------------------------
¶4. (U) Despite Itamaraty's best efforts, not everyone appeared to accept its characterization of the problems besetting the negotiations nor its supposed readjustment in policy focus. While less public than after the contentious Trade Negotiations Committee (TNC) meeting in Trinidad & Tobago last September, press reports cited divergent positions within the GoB, and private sector demands that Itamaraty demonstrate more flexibility in the FTAA negotiations. In addition, an "O Estado" editorial last weekend refused to play the blame game and called for Itamaraty flexibility, pointing out how much Brazil stands to lose from failure of FTAA negotiations.
¶5. (C) MDIC's more forward leaning position on the FTAA was confirmed in informal discussions with Minister Furlan and staff during a dinner hosted by Ambassador April 7. DCM, Deputy Senior Commercial Officer and Econoff also attended. Mario Mugnaini, Executive Secretary of Camex, the GoB's formal decision-making body for trade policy, rejected assertions that the GoB does not want to negotiate the FTAA. However, he conceded that subsequent to the informal Buenos Aires talks, Itamaraty is being forced to moderate its positions. He was adamant that pressure from, among others, Minister Furlan would ensure a more pragmatic approach by Brazilian negotiators in the future, and argued that TNC Co-Chars should meet soon to consider how to get the process moving again.
¶6. (C) Expressing optimism on an eventual successful outcome for the FTAA, Mugnaini pressed the Brazilian line that the current impasse on the common set language would more easily be overcome if market access negotiations could proceed immediately. At least part of Mugnaini's optimism seems to flow from his expectations of a positive response by the U.S. toward improved Mercosul market access offers in goods, services and investment, which he intimated would be unveiled soon. (Note, one press report admitted that Mercosul's initial goods market access offer was the "worst" of any FTAA delegation.) Ambassador insisted that Brazil must work seriously according to the directions from Ministers in Miami and negotiate the common set before market access talks could begin. Mugnaini made references to Itamaraty moving "in the right direction" regarding positions on common set issues, but provided no further detail. Articles the same day reported a lack of support within the Ministries of Development, Agriculture, and Finance, as well as within the private sector, for Itamaraty's insistence on including within the common set a mechanism to compensate for agricultural domestic support within the U.S. and Canada.
------- Comment -------
¶7. (C) Recent events and statements would seem to confirm Itamaraty's lack of commitment toward the FTAA negotiations. That being said, there remain pro-FTAA forces within the Brazilian government and private sector that make it very difficult for Itamaraty to just walk away. There is plenty of room for continued mischief, however. The GoB will likely continue to press for four-plus-one market access talks to begin forthwith. Eventually, Itamaraty may present a reformulation of some of its positions within the common set talks, but these may not prove useful in bridging the gaps that currently exist between FTAA delegations. We suspect that representatives from other ministries and from the private sector who are pushing for more flexibility by Itamaraty, may not prove as effective checks on Itamaraty excesses as would be hoped, due to a less than full appreciation of the nuances within the common set text negotiations.
¶8. (C) Post recommends a continued neutral posture regarding blame for an inability to reach consensus on the common set elements so that domestic interests will have the space to make their own case for a change in GoB posture. However, reinforcement of the message that what we are seeking is a "balanced" common set would be helpful in keeping the focus on revising or eliminating the more problematic GoB positions.
HRINAK